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But employés [sic] cannot as a rule foresee; and they have less power of acting on their knowledge. The consequence is that a rise in wages is seldom or never as fast as that of prices when the cause of the rise is an increase of the currency, that is not accompanied by an increased command over nature. (Marshall, 1926 ; minutes of evidence to the 1899 Committee on Indian Currency)
Sorting out Cambridge expectations
Alfred Marshall's 1899 brief remark about workers' lack of foresight, and its implications for the determination of money-wages, illustrated an opinion shared, but never articulated, by many economists during the Marshallian era. Indeed, workers' expectations are conspicuous by their absence in the then prevailing Cambridge approach to business cycles -advanced by the Marshalls (1879, pp. 152-55, with references to Lord Overstone and J.S. Mill) and fully elaborated by Frederick Lavington (1922) and A.C. Pigou (1927) -with its focus on waves of optimism and pessimism by businessmen. It was not just that workers occasionally held mistaken expectations, but that, unlike businessmen and dealers in the financial and investment markets, they could not foresee at all. W.S. Jevons's (1871) opinion about the inability of the working class to make intertemporal choices was representative of economists' widespread exclusion of "The Other" from their economic principles (see Dimand 2005) . Lavington (1922) argued that isolated "impulses" are "propagated" to the rest of the economy through cumulative "contagion of confidence". The errors of optimism affect directly and indirectly (through its influence on credit and therefore on prices) the estimates of future demand, especially in the investment sector. The prosperity phase ends when the gestation period of the new capital goods is concluded and businessmen realize that their actual yield is lower than anticipated, which is followed by errors of pessimism in the downswing. Pigou (1927) , building on Lavington, assumed that short-periods shifts in the (discounted) demand for labour are caused mainly through changes in expectations of return. Variations in profit expectations are set off by impulses that may be of "real", "psychological" or "monetary" kinds, which lead to the "mutual generation of errors of optimism and pessimism". He rejected the argument that generalised errors of forecast are impossible in the sense that widespread wrong expectations about the movement of a variable are necessarily fulfilled through interaction between agents (see Kregel 1977; Collard 1996; Boianovsky 2005a ).
Like other Cambridge economists before him, Keynes (1936) put expectations at the centre of his macroeconomic framework. However, he departed from the view that unemployment was a short-run disequilibrium phenomenon associated to economic fluctuations brought about by incorrect entrepreneurial anticipations.
Keynes preferred model, for demonstrating the role of effective demand in the determination of unemployment in equilibrium, assumed away disappointments and shifts in expectations. In that formulation, the (general) state of long-term expectations, which decides investment demand, is given and irresponsive to (individual) short-term expectations, which are always realized. Regardless of how agents react to disappointed expectations, the economy moves immediately to the point of effective demand, which may happen at less than full employment for a given "state of the news" (Kregel 1976; see also Bateman 1988, chapters 4 and 5) .
1 Just like Lavington and Pigou, Keynes focused on expectations by businessmen, without dealing in any detail with workers' price expectations and their effects on labour supply decisions and money-wage dynamics.
Pigou and Keynes were both members of King's College. One of the bright economic students at King's in the early 1930s was David Gawen Champernowne (b.1912; d. 2000) , who put forward in 1936 a path-breaking attempt to sort out the unemployment controversy between Keynes (1936) and Pigou (1933) Rymes's (1987; 1989) well-known compilation.
College supervisions formed the core of Cambridge's didactic system, which paid careful attention to the selection, education and relations with students (see Apostles was essentially a conversational society, which required of its members that they be ready to question any established views. The 23-year-old Champernowne followed that strategy closely in his piece about "classical" and "Keynesian" approaches to unemployment, where he dared to challenge both Pigou (1933) and Keynes (1936) , the only references mentioned in the article.
Although a student of Keynes, as a fellow of King's Champernowne was also in close contact with Pigou, as illustrated by his role -encouraged by Richard Kahnin assisting Pigou (1938, p. 134) grasping the notion that the rate of interest is the mechanism through which changes in money-wages affect employment. Indeed, Champernowne (1936, p. 202) were in the field of economic statistics (measurement of income distribution and inequality; and probability, decision making and estimation methods in economics).
Champernowne (or "Champ", as he was known among his friends) held chairs at both Oxford and Cambridge universities, but even during his Oxford period (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) he kept close ties with Cambridge economics.
As discussed below, expectations formation by both businessmen and workers provides the key to Champernowne's (1936) Champernowne described that last scenario as distinctively "Keynesian". 
Labour supply and money-wage dynamics
The "fundamental difference" between Keynes's General Theory and Pigou's Theory of Unemployment, pointed out Champernowne (1936, p. 201) in his opening paragraph, is that, while the former argues that the wage bargains decide the money-wage only, the latter maintains that these bargains succeed in determining the real wage rate. This follows from Keynes's (1936, pp. 10-13) "fundamental objection" to the classical postulate that the real wage corresponds to the marginal disutility of labour (workers are on their labour supply curve). As put by Keynes (p. 13), "there may exist no expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs. This will be our contention". In order to assess Keynes's rejection of classical macroeconomics,
Champernowne put forward a general equilibrium aggregative model, which, unlike Hicks (1937) better-known IS-LM formulation, highlighted the role of the labour market and pointed to the distinct causality structures and expectations mechanisms of "classical" and "Keynesian" frameworks.
Keynes 's (1936, pp. 8-10; 12-13) Keynes (p. 275) was aware of Pigou's remarks that within some limits workers actually bargain for a given money-wage instead of a given real wage. "Conversation with a representative wage-earner" had convinced him that it would be "ridiculous" to assume that workers are more interested in their money-wage than in their real wage. The observed lagged reaction to changes in the cost of living was explained by the existence of wage contracts "based on the expectation of a stationary cost of living", transaction costs involved in contract changes, limited information about price changes, and "the habit of thinking in terms of the price level of some earlier date" (ibid).
Hence, the money-wage rate demanded by workers "today" is the rate that would give them a certain purchasing power "at prices ruling at some date in the past" (p. 203). Prices expected by workers today are those of an earlier contractual period, as expressed in the formula ! ! = !!! , implicit in Champernowne. 4 This "Keynesian" labour supply function, as he called it, was described by ! (Rw), whereas the labour demand function was written as ! (R), where R and w are (actual) real and money wages respectively. There is no money illusion in the labour demand function, as producers are (implicitly) assumed to form correct price expectations: ! ! = ! . This corresponds closely to Keynes's (1936, pp. 50-51) Keynes's notion of "full employment", as a fixed upper-limit described by the absence of "involuntary unemployment", is distinct from Champernowne's idea of "basic unemployment" as a long-run equilibrium position at which workers' price expectations are confirmed and money-wages do not tend to move. His "basic unemployment" is not an upper-limit, since the economy may be above that level if "monetary employment" prevails. As much as Keynes, Pigou (1933 Pigou ( , 1941 ) too regarded full employment as a fixed limit. While arguing for the existence of a longrun tendency to full employment over the business cycle, he remarked that This does not, of course, imply that on the average full employment … exists.
Since we know that employment is sometimes less than full, while it can obviously never be more than full, that would be nonsense. It means that … employment on the average falls short of full employment by a certain quantity attributable to disturbances. (Pigou 1941, p. 79) Again differently from Pigou and Keynes, Champernowne (p. 204) sustained that periods of monetary employment (unemployment) will be accompanied by rising (falling) money-wages, as workers realize that prices are changing and repair their "oversights" accordingly. Such movements of money-wages will eventually bring the rate of unemployment to its equilibrium ("basic") value provided real wages move in the same direction, which brings us to the core of Champernowne's modelling of the Keynes-Pigou dispute.
Monetary policy and the trend of real wages
Keynes's "second wave of attack" on classical Pigouvian analysis was more persuasive than the first one, asserted Champernowne (p. 204 Keynes's second wave of attack, "it follows that the demand of labour for a certain real wage can only make itself effective in so far as it influences the attitude of the monetary authority and its manipulation of the rate of interest" (Champernowne, p.
204). The central bank's reaction is prompted by the acceleration of inflation
(deflation) in periods of "monetary employment" (unemployment). When the rate of unemployment is below its "basic" equilibrium level, money-wages increase and, unless real wages increase as well, prices will rise in the same proportion, with another round of rise of money-wages and so forth. The workers' "bargaining power"
becomes greater and the pace of revision of money-wage demands will become faster as they get "more accustomed" (p. 205) to the effects on real wages of the rise in prices -that is, to the extent that they revise their price level expectations in adaptive fashion.
6 As mentioned above, it was only later that Pigou (1938) , with some help from Champernowne, grasped the interest-rate effect of changes in money-wages. In 1943 he would introduce the famous "Pigou effect" -so named by Patinkin (1965) , who preferred the more comprehensive concept of "real balance effect"-as a reaction to Alvin Hansen's "secular stagnation" hypothesis, when the interest rate mechanism is not operative.
Accelerating inflation puts pressure on monetary authorities to increase the bank rate of interest in attempt to stabilize the economy and bring the rate of unemployment to its "basic" value, as people become concerned that "there should be an inflation 'like in Germany'" (ibid). There is some, not perfect, symmetry in the deflationary period of "monetary unemployment". The fall in money-wages and prices becomes "accelerated", but the pressure on the central bank to reduce interest rates and stabilize prices and output is not as strong, since agents' "influential opinion" is supposed to be more concerned with the danger of a hyperinflation than with the "prospect of a slump 'like they had in America'" (p. 206). This will not prevent the working of stabilization forces in the downswing, but will turn those periods longer than inflationary ones. Eventually, the economy converges to its "basic unemployment" rate -when the supply price of labour is the same as the demand price -which may be interpreted as the "trend" or long-run value of unemployment.
Hence, "provided that the monetary authority does not allow labour to be misled by too long periods of rising or falling cost of living, the 'real supply curve of labour' may be a useful concept for estimating the trend of unemployment, real wages, rate of interest and saving" (p. 216). Champernowne apparently had in mind a Wicksellian price stabilization rule, with the bank interest rate converging to Wicksell's natural rate of interest.
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Assuming the working of the convergence process to "basic unemployment", classical Pigouvian analysis -of determination of real wages by supply and demand for labour -applied. The classical framework is relevant for the investigation of the trend value of unemployment under the assumption that on average monetary employment and unemployment even out in the long-term, but it "breaks down" when actual unemployment is considered. Trend analysis was reminiscent of the study of the classical stationary state, but with net investment going on. Champernowne (1936, p. 207) interest-rate changes cannot be found in Pigou (1933) . Champernowne (1936, p. 211) represented Pigouvian macroeconomics by a system of causal equations, starting with labour market equilibrium: The sequential solution of the "Keynesian system" is, therefore, the opposite of the classical Pigouvian one, as depicted in figures 1 and 2, especially if "indirect effects", such as the influence of income or employment on the Keynesian money demand function, are excluded. These and other "indirect effects" should be considered in a comprehensive general equilibrium representation of both systems, but that would make the distinction between Pigouvian and Keynesian macroeconomics less clear, as Champernowne (p. 211) pointed out. Unlike classical economics, the "Keynesian system" is able to account for "monetary employment"
and "monetary unemployment", even if those concepts -and the notion of workers' adaptive expectations on which they are based -are, strictly speaking, alien to the framework of the General Theory. Moreover, the key issue, from Champernowne's standpoint, was the logical causal structure of Keynes's system. Whereas Pigou took the determination of real wages in the labour market as the starting-point to find the (trend) employment and output levels, the General Theory started from effective demand in order to determine employment, output and real wages. In both systems, real wages are equal to the marginal product of labour (the "first postulate" of classical economics, which Keynes accepted), but the logic is essentially distinct, as stressed by Pasinetti (1974) , Ambrosi (2013) and others after
Champernowne. In fact, pointed out Skidelsky (1992, pp. 575 and 603-4) , by working out the consequences of Keynes's acceptance of the marginal productivity theory of wages, Champernowne became the "first 'Keynesian' to emphasize that the possibility of increasing employment by demand expansion depended heavily on workers not asking for higher wages as prices rose". But Champernowne's "Keynesian system" was not just about the labour market, as already suggested above and further elaborated in the next section.
Keynes vs. Pigou on the role of expectations
Pigou's classical "trend" approach is valid provided monetary phenomena such as unemployment or extra employment due to changes in prices are temporary, so that workers' demand for a certain standard of living asserted itself. The Keynesian system would then apply strictly to the short-run only. However, This [classical] method will be of no avail if outlets for investment are so scarce or if the employers are so nervous of any increase in the supply of money that they hoard, and it is impossible to lower the rate of interest sufficiently to cause sufficient investment to keep prices and money-wages from falling. (Champernowne 1936, p. 216) Persistent "monetary unemployment" was, therefore, associated to the variables Q and Q' in the functions of liquidity preference and investment demand reproduced above. This reflected Champernowne's attendance of Keynes's lectures in the 1933
Michaelmas term, when the latter deployed a formalization of the general theory of employment by a system of simultaneous equations featuring the "state of the news" (W) in the money demand and aggregate demand functions (Rymes 1989, pp. 122-28; Dimand 2007, pp. 85-88) . Keynes (1936, pp. 198-99) did not repeat those equations in the General Theory, although he still used the term "state of the news" to express the change in the "weight of the evidence" or "confidence". Uncertainty of model … My emphasis was on the factors Q and Q' whose changes would shift the curves" (Young 1987, p. 85) . Indeed, Champernowne (1936) was the only review article of the General Theory at the time that stressed expectations as one of its major features and integrated them into the equations (Brady 2017b) . Patinkin (1990, pp. 212-13) inaccurately asserted that Champernowne belonged with other reviewers (Hicks, Lange, Lerner, Hansen, Harrod, Reddaway, Meade) who excluded uncertainty from the main components of Keynes's 1936 book. In any event, as observed by , it was only after George Shackle's articles and books in the 1960s (e.g. Shackle 1967 ) that the interpretation of the "central message" of the General Theory in terms of uncertainty and expectations started to gain some assent.
That was also the time when Champernowne (1964) produced his second (sometimes critical) reading of Keynes, which elaborated on the variables Q and Q', as well as on other "links between the economic future and the present", such as "marginal user cost". Champernowne (1969, vol. 3, p. 80) was aware that Pigou and other
Cambridge economists had ascribed business cycles to waves of optimism and pessimism. He contended, however, that it was not until the General Theory "that a clear account was given" of the effect of expectations on expenditure decisions and of how "a minor change in the 'state of the news' can play havoc" with the stock exchange and capital investment. Keynes (1936, p. 278) acknowledged that Pigou "speaks, it is true, of fluctuations in the state of demand, much as I do". However, when he came to formalize that notion, Pigou (1933) expressed it in terms of his "real demand function for labour", which was quite far from Keynes's notion of fluctuations in aggregate demand (ibid). Pigou's complex real demand for labour function assumed a two-sector economy with a wage-goods and a non-wage-goods sector. Its key feature is that it is employment in the wage-goods sector, determined in reference to a given real wage in terms of consumption goods, that is decisive, with the investment-goods sector adjusted to absorb the rest of labour supply. This is the opposite of the priority of investment demand in Keynes's framework. Hence, Pigou's labour demand function is essentially stable and unable to account for employment fluctuations over the business cycle (see Cottrell 1994; Keynes 1936, pp. 278-79) .
From that perspective, Champernowne's (1936) interpretation -that (long-term) expectations play no active role in the classical analysis of the employment trendseems warranted:
The classical analysis can only take account of the forces Q and Q' considered 
The Champernowne puzzle
Champernowne (1959, pp. 263-64 ) put Pigou together with Keynes and Marshall as the main economists in the history of Cambridge economists. Pigou was Marshall's pupil, and Keynes's colleague and co-protagonist in a "one sided controversy".
However, he found Pigou's training in mathematics inferior to that of Keynes and
Marshall. Pigou "lacked Marshall's passionate concern with practical and human problems" and Keynes's "brilliance and intuitive sense for pick out the key relations in an economic situation". The strength of Pigou, according to Champernowne (p. Friedman's (1968) natural unemployment rates, with their emphases on workers' price expectations, went unnoticed until historians of thought (Darity and Goldsmith 1995; Darity and Young 1995; Boianovsky 2005b; Boianovsky 2018 ) discussed it.
Champernowne did not react to Friedman's natural rate concept. He was busy at the time completing his 1969 3 volumes on uncertainty and estimations, which tackled fundamental issues in Cambridge probability theory since Ramsey and Keynes. In fact, one cannot help wonder whether Champernowne's apparent lack of interest for Friedman's Presidential Address reflected the fact that his theoretical references came usually from Cambridge (or Oxford occasionally) academics, which he regarded as his audience as well. Be as it may, Champernowne (1969) followed a predominantly Bayesian approach to probability and decision making under uncertainty, which did not square so well with Keynes's approach. Indeed, Champernowne (1964, pp. 192-93) observed critically that the links between the present and the future in the General Theory are in one direction only. "Although Keynes has so much to say about the effects of expectations about the future on present economic behaviour, he seems to be not nearly so informative about the causation of these expectations". Champernowne did not feel confortable with
Keynes's treatment of expectations as exogenously given by "psychology and convention", despite their role in his 1936 assessment. Interestingly enough, that brought him closer to Pigou (1950) , who acknowledged the importance of expectations in Keynes (1936) , but criticized the apparent lack of explanation of how they are formed.
